A Game of Plea Bargains: How Game Theory Explains Plea Bargaining and its Shortfalls in India, the U.S. and Around the Globe.

Abstract

Now and then plea-bargaining is thrown under the spotlight, sometimes as a silver lining for systems like India, where there is a dire need of speedy disposal of cases, and sometimes as a plague haunting the west. The most recent examples include the case of Benjamin Netanyahu; and of the Tablighi Jamaat, both generating mixed reactions. It is, therefore, to be analysed if and how plea bargaining adds to the criminal justice system and what threats it presents. Plea bargaining is a key area of intersection between criminal law and economics, and the answers can be explored through game theory. For evaluating strategies in practical scenarios, an empirical study has been carried out parallelly to know a player’s decisions. It is presented that every player – the prosecutor, defendant as well as judge – indeed consider their interests but at the same time are bound by their duties due to societal influences. While the process has been relatively ineffective in India, it is necessary to consider the issues it faces in this jurisdiction. Additionally, the analysis of the procedure can help evaluate plausible solutions to the broader threats and disadvantages it brings to the system. Only that can help in envisioning a holistic implementation.